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Commentary/Dennett & Kinsbourne: Time and the observer
plans, stores them in memory, and keeps track of where the
execution of each one stands.
I suggest that the escape from stimulus-response behavior
makes consciousness necessary, a keeping track in memory of
internal rather than external controls on behavior. It is this
continuous plan-monitoring function, and nothing more or less,
that we define as consciousness. Thus consciousness is
emergent from the process of driving behavior from internally
held plans. Consciousness is not an object in itself, but a side
effect of other neurological operations. In defining conscious-
ness in this way we also redefine psychology, from a study of
stimulus-response contingencies to a study of the plans that
drive behavior.
There is no room for a "Cartesian Theater" in this conception,
but the function of consciousness clearly fits with a parallel
"multiple-drafts" notion, for many plans exist simultaneously
(everything from short-term plans such as cooking dinner to
long-term ones such as earning a Ph.D.). The control of be-
havior is a giant juggling act. Existing plans are evaluated along
with incoming sensory information and the execution of one
plan wins out. At the same time, new plans and new subparts of
existing plans are created.
This interpretation of the function of a conscious mind has
consequences in several illusions where the differences be-
tween consciousness and reality are particularly evident. One
such consequence is the illusion of the knife-edge of time
discussed by D & K. There is no need to micromanage temporal
relationships in a range where time distortions in the incoming
sensory channels and the motor apparatus begin to become
significant. But the concept of the knife-edge precision of
definition is necessary to assign a temporal order, however
arbitrary, to events and actions. As D & K point out, the
temporal tag is not itself a temporal event; it is useful in the
planning and plan-executing processes, not in the real-time
operation of the brain.
A second illusion, not discussed by D & K but illuminating in
this context, is the feeling that the visual field presents a detailed
and veridical representation of the surrounding world. Every-
one shares an almost irresistible introspection that the visual
world present in consciousness is, for example, in full color and
sharp focus. Yet we know that reasonable color coding exists
only in the central 30° or so of the retinal image, and that
sharpest focus and high-acuity imaging occupy only a tiny region
in the fovea. We see not the retinal image, but some idealized
combination of sensory information, memory, and assumption
combined so seamlessly that we are unaware that most of what
we perceive isn't actually available in the retinal signal. It is just
this composite that is useful in making decisions based on visual
information - the immediately present visual image is just a
processing stage, a small part of the available information.
A third illusion is the distal reference that characterizes both
sensory and motor operations. We perceive objects in the
world, not in the eye or ear, and we feel objects, not deforma-
tions on the skin. Awareness arises only where it is functionally
advantageous, at a level of coding where sensory and motor
processes are coded as common, distally oriented events (Prinz
1991). A wealth of empirical work (summarized by Bridgeman
1990) is now available that distinguishes what processing is
available in consciousness and what is not.
It may seem ironic that the processes of creating plans,
accessing memory, and keeping track of everything are them-
selves unconscious, that we are unaware in consciousness of the
functions that support consciousness. But if we think of con-
sciousness as a result of planning capabilities, not as a system in
itself that must be modeled, there is no reason why conscious-
ness should appear at a mechanism level and there is no
mechanism to make that possible. Consciousness is not a moni-
tor of mental life but a result of mental operations separated
from the immediate sensorimotor world.
Experiential facts?
Andy Clark
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In this timely piece, Dennett & Kinsbourne (D & K) attack what
they term the image of the Cartesian Theater. The key move in
their argument is to insist that just as judgments about, for
example, redness do not require corresponding brain events
that are actually red, so, too, judgments about temporal se-
quence need not involve the construction, somewhere in the
brain, of an actual sequence of brain events that are temporally
related in just the same way as the events which figure in the
judgment (see e.g., sect. 1.1, para. 6; sect. 2.1, para. 6). To
suppose that judgments of sequence must depend on the abso-
lute sequence of brain events at some (functional) point where
"it all comes together" is a mistake that, it is claimed, can make a
variety of phenomena involving subjective judgments of tem-
porality seem needlessly anomalous. I believe D & K are right to
reject this strong image of the Cartesian Theater, but their
argument goes further, for they then go on to deny the distinc-
tion between:
a. cases where an agent actually has a subjective experience
of some event (like seeing a woman without glasses) but later
comes to judge that the woman wore glasses all along (the
"Qrwellian" story - sect. 2.2., para. 7), and
b. cases where the agent's original experience was of seeing a
woman with glasses (even though the woman in question was
not wearing any), and this experience is accurately recalled in
the later judgment that she had glasses on (the "Stalinesque"
story, sect. 2.2, para. 8).
It is not obvious (to me at least) why this distinction needs to
be denied. For such a denial is not forced upon us when we give
up the image of the Cartesian Theater. We may agree that later
judgments of the temporal order of events need not be
grounded in a kind of action replay in which we construct brain
events of matching temporality. But we may still believe that
there were facts about the immediate contents of conscious
experience so that it can (for example) simply be true (or false)
that at time t, you had the experience of seeing a woman without
glasses. Such conscious states may surely form an absolute
temporal sequence independent of the agent's propensity to
later judge that given conscious states did or did not occur. And
this is, on the face of it, all that is needed to justify the
Orwellian/Stalinesque distinction. In short, I don't see why
recognising the errors D & K point out undermines the idea of
an absolute timing of conscious contents or of absolute facts
about conscious contents. Such facts could be quite indepen-
dent of our later judgments, and be facts nonetheless.
D & K's position is somewhat clarified by the example of
metacontrast. Here, faced with the question "Did conscious
perception of a disc occur?" they decline to answer, saying that
"information about the disc was briefly in a functional position to
contribute to a later report, but this state lapsed" (sect. 2.2,
para. 29). The question of whether the disc perception was ever
conscious is one that D & K claim is opaque to both the agent
and to any outside observers. Probe the agent at different times
and you will get different answers. Both Stalinesque and Or-
wellian stories are, it seems, "consistent with whatever the
subject says, or thinks, or remembers" (sect. 2.2, para. 36). But
this is surely only true if "thinks" here means "later judges to be
the case." If we believe that there are facts about conscious
contents and that such facts are in principle independent of later
verbal reports, the distinction can be maintained. Perhaps it is
the idea of facts about conscious mental experiences indepen-
dent of facts about later verbal judgments that D & K really seek
to displace?
I suspect that this is indeed the case and that D & K really
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want to cast doubt on the very idea of an experiential fact - a fact
about the content of conscious experience at a given moment.
The arguments concerning temporal and spatial smear (sect.
1.1) suggest that they wish to reject the very idea of a single
conscious observer as a locus of experiential facts. But nothing in
the explicit argument seems to justify this radical conclusion.
We could grant that a variety of brain states (spatially dis-
tributed) could be implicated in the construction of immediate
conscious contents- and yet still discover that there is some
functional property (e.g., of synchrony of neural activity in
certain regions), which is both necessary for a content to become
consciously known and yields an absolute temporal order of
experiences (with specific contents) - an order that need not,
however, be preserved in later judgments about the order. I
cannot see that this possibility is ruled out by anything that
Dennett and Kinsbourne tell us.
To sum up, the move from the (proper and important)
rejection of the idea that judgments of temporality require a
matching temporal sequence of brain events to the denial of the
Orwellian/Stalinesque distinction looks problematic. The tran-
sition could be oiled by some radical views about the nonexis-
tence of experiential facts or the relation between conscious
content and verbal report. If there is indeed such a hidden
agenda, it should come on stage for the curtain calls.
Th® selfless consciousness
Antonio R. Damasio
Department of Neurology, University of Iowa College of Medicine, Iowa
City, IA 52240
Electronic mail: cmdardpg@uiamvs.hitnet
I enjoyed reading Dennett & Kinsbourne's (D & K's) target
article. It provides interesting ammunition against the intuition
that consciousness depends on a single brain locus where
multifarious information comes together, in spatial and tem-
poral terms. This notion, which D & K modestly refer to as a
"prevailing view," is far worse than that: It informs virtually all
research on mind and brain, explicitly or implicitly, and is
certainly the common sense concept of the nonscientist and
nonphilosopher in the street. My other comments are as follows:
(1) The evidence presented by D & K ..draws on cognitive
science and is damaging enough to the Cartesian Theater
model. I think, however, that D & K could have made an even
stronger case by using evidence from experimental neuroana-
tomy, neurophysiology, neuropsychology, and computational
neuroscience. Elsewhere I have analyzed part of that evidence
to construct an argument against one or even a few "integrative"
brain sites (Damasio 1989a; 1989b; 1990). For instance, there is
no neuroanatomical structure in the cerebral cortex to which
signals from all the sensory modalities that may be represented
in our experience can converge, spatially and temporally. The
entorhinal cortex and the hippocampus might be candidates for
that sort of "integrative" role but they do not pass the necessary
anatomical tests. Also, we know for certain that they cannot do
the job because patients in whom such structures are destroyed
bilaterally (e.g., patients Boswell [see Damasio et al. 1989] and
H. M. [see Corkin 1984]) do not have a disturbance of conscious-
ness in the sense discussed by D & K. (It can be argued that
BoswelFs highest level of self-consciousness is not intact since
he cannot access a large body of unique memories from his past,
but it is clear that he deals quite self-consciously and appropri-
ately with the universe, at categorical level). The prefrontal
cortex, another region associated with consciousness in the
minds of most people that have ever thought about the brain, is
an even less adequate candidate than the entorhinal cortex for
the "integrative" locus underlying a Cartesian Theater. It pro-
vides many anchor points for signals hailing from various sen-
sory streams and from the motor system, but there is no single
site to which "representations" can cohere spatially and tem-
porally. Extensive bilateral ablation of prefrontal cortices in
humans does not preclude basic consciousness, although, again,
we have argued that the highest levels of self-consciousness are
not possible without these structures.
(2) I had two problems with D & K's proposal. The first and
most important is that the rejection of one biologically impossi-
ble Cartesian Theater does not amount to rejecting the sense of
one self doing the experiencing. There are, without a doubt,
neural systems whose operation generates the sense of self, and
on the basis of which we construct the false intuition that there is
one brain site where experience happens. A satisfactory model of
consciousness should indicate how the dis-integrated fragments
operate to produce the integrated self. My impression is that the
Multiple Drafts model is part of an alternative to the Cartesian
Theater model but not a complete one. I would suggest that
there are two necessary functions missing from the Multiple
Drafts model without which I cannot fathom how consciousness,
illusory phenomenon that it may be, will emerge. The first
function is the sustained updating of critical sets of knowledge of
the individual doing the experiencing. The sets encompass both
taxonomically categorical levels of knowledge ("supraordinate"
and "basic object"), as well as unique level ("subordinate" and
autobiographical). The updated knowledge refers not only to the
past but also to the future, that is, to memories of intended
actions and plans. The second function is the sustained monitor-
ing of somatic states of the experiencer, to include both visceral
and musculoskeletal sectors ot Ihe organism. I suspect that
the updating of previously acquired knowledge is implied in the
Multiple Drafts hypothesis, but I saw no reference to the
possible role of somatic states. I do not believe consciousness is
possible without having something like the multiple drafts of D
& K referred to the somatic base of the experiencer. Only
awareness, in the sense used by Crick and Koch (1990), might be
possible without a somatic reference.
I am persuaded that the multiple drafts mechanism alone will
produce a selfless, disembodied consciousness. Incidentally,
selfless consciousness can almost happen in some circum-
stances. An example is anosognosia, a neurological condition
caused by extensive parietal and frontal damage in the human
right hemisphere. The patients are unable to monitor their
somatic states comprehensively and become unconcerned with
their medical problems and with their future implications. They
can give evidence that some externally generated representa-
tions of their own body do not pertain to themselves. I usually
teach about this condition by stating that the lesion has "chipped
part of consciousness away," that many percepts and thoughts of
these patients are no longer referred to their bodies (for a similar
perspective on the neurobiological basis of the self, see Merleau
Ponty or, more recently, Edelman, 1989). Deep level medita-
tion is another circumstance in which consciousness loses itself,
so to speak, and eventually dissolves (this can be achieved in
certain forms of Buddhist meditation).
(3) My second problem has to do with the degree of dissolu-
tion of the Cartesian Theater in D & K's alternative. How dis-
integrated, neurally speaking, need dis-integration be? I agree
that there is no single Cartesian Theater, but I suspect that there
may be many such theaters, or, to use my own metaphor, many
stages on which relatively coherent drafts of ongoing neural
activity play out, at slightly different times. The point here is
that it is plausible that some components of our experience
actually depend on a local integration of neural sets of activity.
For example, under certain circumstances this might happen in
primary sensory cortices as a result of synchronization gener-
ated by feedback.
My closing comment is about the connection between con-
sciousness and the timing of neural events. This is an important
issue and is finally receiving the attention it deserves. That time
can provide the illusion of a single place has been proposed by
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